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Testimony before a subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C., May 19, 1983
Mine is an unenviable assignment.

How could anyone possibly oppose

guidelines that are designed to protect the consumer?

It takes a hard

heart to question the proposed United Nations' promulgation of such good
things as product safety and purity, consumer education, and international
cooperation.
Yet, sadly, when you push aside the verbiage customary in
international position papers, you quickly find that the

11

Draft Guidelines for

Consumer Protection, .. now before the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), would flunk a truth-in-labeling test.

Indeed, the so-called

Guidelines have the makings of a blueprint for a more centrally directed
society than now exists in any of the market-oriented economies in the world.
When we look beyond the label, it is apparent that the Guidelines are a
model of vagueness and over-blown phraseology.

Grand and unusual goals are

set forth in language that is, at best, highly generalized and unclear.
Attempts to carry out these Guidelines would surely result in worldwide
confusion.
Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American
Business at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a former Chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisers and served as Chairman of the Economic Policy
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Ronald J. Penoyer assisted in the underlying research for this statement.
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In any event, the Guidelines likely would produce results contrary to the
goal of open international trade promoted for many years by the United States.
Some parts of this code of conduct would impose burdensome and costly controls
on the world 1 s economies -- and would tend to close, rather than open up,
international markets.

It is my belief that the United States and many other

nations would be inviting disenchantment, as well as substantial costs, if
they were to adopt this proposal.

Above all, consumers themselves would be

hurt rather than protected.
In addition, the Guidelines show the United Nations to be drifting
further away from its fundamental and crucial goal of promoting and
maintaining world peace.

By seeking to regulate the commerce and internal

economic activities of its member nations, the U.N. is stepping into areas
that are properly left to individual countries.

Furthermore, the U.N. is

diverting its limited resources from its basic role of peacekeeper.
Implications of the Guidelines
The Draft Guidelines for Consumer Protection contain, first of all, seven
objectives which are written "with special emphasis on the needs of developing
nations." The objectives are, almost necessarily, quite general in nature.

Several of them are particularly problematic.

For example, one objective is

"to facilitate production patterns geared to meeting the most important needs
of consumers."

In economies organized along private enterprise lines, the

needs of consumers are always the strongest influence on "production
patterns"; the pressures of the marketplace dictate that.

But the Guidelines

suggest the need for a controlled, highly centralized economy in which
consumer choices are in practice limited by the decisions of an all-wise
central government.

This objective strongly implies that a central government
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must identify, and then control, the means of achieving the "most important
needs" of consumers.

We need only consult the dismal record of any of the

world 1 s communist, centrally planned economies in feeding and meeting other
essential needs of their citizens to know that promulgating this objective
would severely hurt, rather than help, the developing nations.
Moreover, this objective overlooks the importance of world trade in
meeting the needs of consumers.

More than ever before, the more developerl

nations gear production for international markets rather than for the
so-called "moPe impoPtant needs" of their own consumers.
instructive.

The case of Japan is

If its post-war economy had been limited to meeting the

needs of its own population, it surely would not enjoy the influence in world
markets and the high standard of living that it has today.

The same holds

true for other market economies, ranging from West Germany to Hong Kong.
Let me quote a second sweeping and ill-conceived objective of the
Guidelines:
To cupb business pPactices at the national and intePnational levels
which advepsely affect consumePs (including abuses of a dominant
position of ~Pket powep by pPivate and public entePpPises).

Surely we all deplore business abuses, but how do we define business practices
that "advePsely affect consumePs"?

It is possi b1e that a so-ca 11 ed "advePse

effect" in India or Zaire would instead be a salutary effect for consumers in

the Caribbean or Colombia.

Comparative effects make it extremely difficult,

if not impossible, to carve in stone what is a "good" product or service and
what is "bad ...
Moreover, nearly any product or business practice may be arbitrarily
1abel ed

11

abusi ve" when it is held up against a standard that cannot be

achieved or which consumers do not wish to pay for.

Under the proposed
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Guidelines, for example, Brand X Soap might be held to
consumers simply because it does not have the
Soap.

11

11

adversely affect 11

ideal 11 qualities of BrandY

And where would this kind of thinking lead us?

In many ways, this

objective is a Pandora•s box which, once opened, could be used to limit the
choices of consumers around the world.

It could even be used as a

justification for erecting trade barriers, or strengthening barriers that
a1ready exist.
Other objectives in the Guidelines are equally troubling when we
consider their far-reaching nature.

Here is an example:

To pPomote just, equitable and sustainable economic and social
development.

This is an imposing, high-minded ideal.
11

just 11 and

11

equitable 11 in any specific instance?

decide -- and then control
another

11

But who is going to define what is

what is

11

Also, who is going to

Sustainable 11 development?

And here is

0bjective 11 :

To establish standaPds of ethical conduct fop those engaged in
pPoduction and distPibution of goods and sePvices to consumePs.

Certainly, ethical conduct is laudatory.
11

But who will set the standards of

ethical conduct 11 ? Who will place themselves above all others and regulate

private behavior?

I shudder to think how substantially a totalitarian

interpretation of ethical conduct would differ from that of various free
societies.
The draft Guidelines also contain a set of general principles that
governments are called upon to follow "to develop oP stpengthen theiP consumep
pPotection policies."

These principles are written as high-minded but vague

and controversial notions of
the right to:

11

rights. 11

The list is impressive and includes
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"physical safety fpom dangePous goods and sePVices"
"economic safety fpom offences OP rralpPactices" that deny
benefits to consumePs
consumeP infoPmation and education
"available and effective PedPess"
fopm consumeP gpoups and have these gPoups' views PepPesented
in "the decision-making pPocess"

At first blush, most of these principles or "rights" seem to be
admirable and worthy.

But even if some kind of consensus could be reached on

these principles, we must remember that they do not materialize out of thin
air.

Making them a reality is not automatic.

In each case, they imply a

substantial expansion of the role of government, at least in the economies
now based on markets and competition.
Furthermore, nowhere do the Guidelines stipulate that there are costs
attached to the litany of benefits.

A sense of balance between costs and

benefits (and between costs and effectiveness) is essential if consumer
protection is to be considered -- especially in less developed nations where
resources are so limited.

For example, the achievement of greater physical

safety involves added costs in producing or distributing a product,
particularly if the goal is anything approaching the idyllic "zero risk 11
notion embedded in much existing consumer protection legislation.
The United States has learned the lesson that government-mandated safety
standards raise the price of products -- and, as a result,

11

pri ce out 11 some of

the most vulnerable consumers (e.g., those with low incomes) from the market
for those prorlucts.
consumer risk.

Ironically, such

11

pricing out 11 could lead to greater

For example, requiring a safer but more expensive ladder than

those now in common usage would probably cause many people climb on chairs and
tables instead -- a much riskier approach than using existing ladders, with
whatever shortcomings they possess.
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Thus, product safety regulation can be an imperfect and even
self-defeating tool.

Moreover, individual beliefs of what is proper or

adequate safety protection are not absolute.

The world over, some people want

more safety in a product, while some people may want less.

In certain

instances, people require a great deal of safety from a step-ladder or an
appliance or a tool; in other instances, consumers do not.
Who, then, is going to decide what constitutes "physical safety," as set
forth in these Guidelines?

Who is going to decide what are "dangepous goods

In terms of injuries, few consumer products may compete with

and sePvices"?

the kitchen knife in terms of frequency of injuries.

Clearly the utility of

many products leads us to accept a reasonable amount of risk in our daily
lives.
Similarly, criticisms may be made about the statement in the Guidelines
of "the Pight to such infoPmation as is necessary in oPdeP to mxke infoPmed
choices."

Transmitting information about goods and services is a worthy goal,

if the information is useful and accurate.
approached.

But the task needs to be carefully

Just take a look at the maze of fine print that is often required

on products in this country -- fine print which results from the regulator's
simple-minded notion that more information is always better than less.

It is

important to realize that market economies reduce the need for specific
product information.

Producers of goods and services know that they have a

reputation at stake in their brand names; it is in their interest to maintain
a high quality in what they produce rather than to provide voluminous (and
often unused)

11

i nformati on. 11

As for the "Pight to consumeP em..tcation," the U.N. Guidelines imply the
same high-handed attitude towards educational systems as they do toward
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economic systems.

Consumers in less developed countries may, in fact, need a

great deal of education with regard to products and services -- but they may
need basic ectucational skills even more.

As an educator, I am naturally

suspicious when outside interests attempt to dictate the contents of a
curriculum.

The results are usually ineffective utilization of scarce

education a1 resources.
A questioning attitude also must be taken with respect to the proposed
"Pight to available and effective PedPess." Apart from quibbling about a

useful definition of what constitutes "effective redress" at an international
level, we would have to examine whether a new claims court, or something on
that order, would duplicate or override existing legal systems.

That is just

one illustration among many of the dangers inherent in using broad, sweeping
language in setting forth new policies at the international level.
One general principle in the Guidelines raises very grave concerns:
the r-ight to economic safety f-pom offenses OP ~lpPactices ~hich
deny consumePs optimum benefit ~ithin theiP economic Pesou-pces.

Taken at face value, this is merely gibberish.

But given the frequency with

which people in communist countries are thrown in jail for so-called "economic
offenses" against the state, this provision is potentially a very dangerous
part of the proposed U.N. Guidelines.

Is "Big Brother

11

to determine what are

"offenses and rralpmctices" and the point at which consumers have derived
"optimum benefit" from resources?

If this so-called principle does anything,

it points out that the list of various "rights" is a matter for individual
nations to decide.
Further, the related principle that "tPansnational coPpoPations should
eonfoPm to national and intePnational standaPds fop eonsumep pPoteetion" is

not only vague in its stated purpose, but blatantly discriminatory.

Why are
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"transnational corporations" singled out for special attention, and not all
enterprises?

I can only conclude that transnationals are focused upon in

these Guidelines as a scapegoat.
The one-sidedness of the Guidelines is further indicated in the "right"
of consumer organizations "to be consulted and to have theiP views PepPesented
in the decision-making pPocess." The Guidelines make absolutely no provision

for representing the views of private enterprise -- the very businesses that
would be regulated under these Guidelines.

In fact, this U.N. document is not

written from the viewpoint of free-market societies:

it speaks of "the

decision-making pPocess, " as though only one can exist.

the give-away.

That, I believe, is

These Guidelines are not intended for free, private-enterprise

economies; they are designed to establish or promote centralized, planned
economies in which the national government makes the key economic decisions.
Further Implications of the Guidelines
It is useful to list some of the specific Guidelines and let them speak
for themselves.

Do any of these sound like regulatory areas in which the

United Nations should be involved?
It is the Pesponsibility of the ~nufactuPeP to ensuPe that goods
pPoduced aPe adequately safe fop intended and noPmal use. It is the
Pesponsibi li ty of the impoPteP OP distPibutoP to ensuPe that no
unsafe goods aPe bPought onto the ~Pket. • • •
GoVePnments should • • • ensupe that the intended level of safety is
met • • • thPough compliance with safety Pegulations, national OP
intePnational standaPds, and volunta~ agPeements, and by PequiPing
the maintenance of exact safety PecoPds.

On the one hand, the Guidelines are clearly dictatorial:

governments should

"ensure" safety and, presumably, determine an "intended" level of safety.

On

the other hand, they ask governments to create paperwork mi 11 s "by Pequinng
the

~intenance

of exact safety PecoPds."

There is no indication of having
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learned from experience in the United States with agencies such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

OSHA has been cutting back its

paperwork requirements after learning that so much of its initial, onerous
recordkeeping requirements were not needed.
There are other provisions worthy of our attention.

Here are several

Guidelines listed under "protection of economic interest":
Gove~ment poli~ies

should seek to ensuPe that
maximum benefit fpom theiP e~onomi~ PesouP~es.

~onsumePs

Does not this describe the United Nations as a global "nanny"?

obtain the

Extending this

notion to its "illogical conclusion," if I want to buy something silly for my
wife's birthday, I could wind up violating a U.N. policy.
Here's another provision:
PPoducePs should ensuPe the availability of Peliable

afte~sales

sePVi~e.

From the standpoint of economics and simple logic, this Guideline is total
nonsense.

Why presume that service must be provided by the producer, unless a

sale is a non-competitive, tie-in sale?

Production and service, after all,

are not necessarily provided best by the same source -- at least this is true
in competitive, open markets.
United Nations?

Moreover, is this properly a concern of the

In the United States, we do not consider this an area for

government regulation at all.
The same criticisms apply to the following Guideline:
Gove~ments

should foPmulate and put into effect national codes on
mapketing and otheP business pPactices to ensupe that such pPa~ti~es
aPe faiP to consumeps. ConsumeP oPganizations should paPti~ipate in
the elaboPation and monitoPing of such ~odes.

The demand for "national codes" such as those mentioned here completely
ignores the fact that several member nations of the U.N. have a federal form
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of government in which the powers of the national government are limited.
Examples include the United States, Australia, Canada, and West Germany.
Two other Guidelines in the category of
interests

11

again cast the shadow of

11

11

protection of economic

Big Brother ...

One is the following:

GovePnments should intensify theiP effoPts to pPeVent economic
offenses thPough systematically monitoPing the adhePence to the
established laws and standaPds by pPoducePs, distPibutoPs and othePs
involved in the pPoVision of goods and sePVices.

It goes on to state that consumer groups "should be eneouPaged and suppoPted
in monitoPing economic offenses." What is the true meaning and purpose of a

provision such as this one?

What sort of government systematically monitors

the actions of private citizens?

What sort of government encourages and

supports specific private groups in the monitoring of other private groups, as
though they were licensed vigilantes?

It is obvious that the authors of the

Guidelines have little interest in either economic freedom or personal
1i berty.
Another suspect Guideline is the following:
GovePnments should consideP adopting a specific policy fop impPoving
the distPibution system fop essential consumeP goods and sePVices,
paPticulaPly in r-uPal apeas.

Why only rural areas?
provision allow for?

But beyond that, what amount of choice does such a
Who is going to decide what are the

11

essential 11 goods

and services?
Guidelines Relating to Specific Industries
It is also helpful to examine the Guidelines which have been proposed for
specific industries.

Here is one example:

GoVePnments, when fopmulating national policies and plans with
PegaPd to food pPoduetion and distPibution, should take into account
the needs of all consumeP gpoups. Such policies and plans should
inteP alia pPovide fop adequate post-haPVest handling, stoPage,

11
pPo~essing and distPibution and should in~lude ~~hanisms fop
appPopPiate a~tivity in the aase of seasonal flu~tuation in food
supply and pPi~es.

Again, let us look at the true meaning of a Guideline such as this one.

How

is a government going to take into account the needs of 11 all 11 consumer groups
unless, in fact, it identifies and controls the

11

needs 11 of those groups?

possible role could private enterprise play in such a process?

What

Certainly a

very small one, since carrying out the Guideline will inevitably require
centra 1i zed planning.

The same applies to "adequate post-haPVest handling, "

and so forth, since a central government would have to direct those processes.
But perhaps the most disturbing part of this provision is the bureaucratic
language about
flu~tuation

"me~hanisms

fop appPopPiate

in food supply and

pPi~e."

controls and, further, import controls.

a~tivity

in the oose of seasonal

Plainly and simply, this means price
This Guideline is totally

inconsistent with the workings of a modern private enterprise economy.
The Guidelines• disregard of the market system is further displayed in
two provisions under national strategies "foP food safety and quality
~ontPol."

One of these states:

Food ~ontamination mvnitoPing and ~ontPol pPogPammes should be
established OP stPengthened. • • •

This Guideline gives absolutely no indication that some countries have already
done this -- and done it quite well without United Nations mandates.

Instead,

what we have here is a simple-minded assertion and the belief, as always in
these draft Guidelines, that more is better than less -- more regulation, more
intervention and control, more power in a central government.
standards

or "Pemedial

a~tions"

Food

in the words of the Guideline -- can be

used by a nation to justify the erection of barriers to international trade.
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Finally, we see once again how the marketplace gets superseded in another
section concerning food:
Business pPactices affecting the ppocessing and distPibution of food
pPoducts and especiatty the maPketing of highty Pefined and expensive
food pPoducts shoutd be Pegutated in oPdeP to ensuPe that such
pPactices do not conftict with consumePs' intePests OP govePnment
aims in the aPea of food poticy.

Who is going to judge the so-called

11

conflict 11 between consumers' interests

and business practices regarding the processing, distribution and marketing of
food products?
type of
product.

11

In free societies with market economies, if there is some kind

Conflict, 11 consumers will protect their interests by not buying the
Resorting to regulation may simply project "goverrnment aims" in food

policy -- and that is probably the true purpose of this provision.

Moreover,

why are ''highty pefined and expensive food pPoducts" singled out here?

What

all-wise power in a nation is going to determine that a specific category of
food products presents a 11 conflict 11 with the interests of consumers, whereas
another category does not?
The Central Role of the U.N.
International regulation of the production and distribution of goods and
services via these Guidelines is a far cry from the central role of the United
Nations which is, according to the U.N. charter,
peace and security ...

11

to maintain international

That role deserves the greatest amount of emphasis in

the dangerous world in which we live.

Frankly, it is sad to see the U.N.

diverting its resources to large-scale forms of economic regulation when it is
doing such an inadequate job of carrying out the basic tasks for which it was
established.
One purpose of the United Nations set forth in its charter is

11

to achieve

international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,
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social, cultural or humanitarian character ...
pursued in the interests of world peace.

Surely this goal should be

But these Guidelines for Consumer

Protection make no effort to enhance economic cooperation among nations.

They

would, in fact, tend to damage economic conditions in developing nations,
where the cause of peace is so crucial today.
Above all, the U.N. charter explicitly prohibits the United Nations from
intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state."

Much of what the Consumer Protection Guidelines has to offer

would involve just such intervention -- and on a massive scale.

The examples

I have presented here show that, wittingly or unwittingly, the Guidelines
point to a society in which governments in each nation of the world would have
a much larger role in economic activity

sometimes by orders of magnitude.

Conclusion
Regulation of internal economic activity is a matter for individual
nations to carry out.

As we have seen for many years now in the United

States, regulation is a mixed blessing.

It can be an imperfect, costly, and

at times counterproductive instrument.

Moreover, the proposed U.N. Consumer

Protection Guidelines are not consistent, by any stretch of the imagination,
with the workings of a private enterprise economy.

Rather, they are designed

to promote a much larger government role in the private sector.

If the United

Nations were to take on the role of global "nanny" in regulating the
activities of private enterprise, it would likely do so at the expense of
sacrificing many of the freedoms that are basic to the United States and many
other member nations.
To recapitulate, in this statement I have attempted to make three main
points:

(1) the U.N. Guidelines attempt to impose centralized control on the
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economies of sovereign nations, (2) the United Nations should focus instead on
its fundamental role of peacekeeper, and (3) the U.N. should not assume the
role of global

11

nanny 11 or international consumer 11 cop. 11

